<div dir="ltr"><div>Dear colleagues,</div><div><br></div><div>XAdES experts (Kimura, Miyachi, and Miyazaki) attended the </div><div>last meeting of the Japanese SC34 mirror. Here is our position</div><div>on the introduction of XAdES to OPC.</div>
<div><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">- Reference ISO 14533-2, which provides two </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> conformance levels of XAdES.</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">- Introduce two conformance levels of OPC. One is </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">
based on XAdES-T while the other, XAdES-A.</div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">- Allow validation restricted to XAdES-T and also </div>
<div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> allow validation including XAdES-A.</div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">
- Introduce an informative annex for depicting the </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> workflow around long-term digital signature. It </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">
should describe the grace period clearly.</div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">- Introduce a remedy for compromised hash algorithms.</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> Since OPC uses ds:Manifest, such compromise allows </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> potential attacks to XAdES signatures. D.14 of the </div>
<div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> latest draft of XAdES fro ETSI (see <a href="http://docbox.etsi.org/esi/Open/Latest_Drafts/prEN-319132-1v004-XAdES-core-STABLE-DRAFT.pdf" target="_blank">http://docbox.etsi.org/esi/Open/Latest_Drafts/prEN-319132-1v004-XAdES-core-STABLE-DRAFT.pdf</a>) already introduces such a remedy.</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">- Make clear which option of XAdES is allowed and which </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px">
is disallowed in OPC. For example, are counter</div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:14.285714149475098px"> signatures allowed?</div><div><br></div>Regards,<div>Makoto</div></div>